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UNDERSEA L AWFARE
Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat?
Michael T. Palmer and J. Michael Johnson

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
SUN TZU

A federal judge has ruled in favor of environmentalists who assert the
Navy has vastly underestimated the threat to marine mammals posed by
its use of sonar and explosives during training off Southern California
and Hawaii.

A

LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1 APRIL 2015

s the world’s only superpower, the United States of America finds itself challenged by adversaries who know they cannot confront it directly, toe to toe,
on traditional battlefields, or on or under the world’s oceans.1 In their attempts to
follow Sun Tzu’s instruction to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” potential adversaries of the United States continuously assess and probe American strengths
and weaknesses to identify vulnerabilities for military, political, and industrial
exploitation. It is not fully appreciated, assessed, or addressed by American policy
makers and warfighters how vulnerable the U.S. military is to the threat of “lawfare,” both international and domestic environmental.
The leading expert on lawfare, Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S.
Air Force (Ret.), defines it as the use or abuse of law and legal processes as a
substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives.2 Both international environmental-protection political processes and American domestic
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes offer tempting targets for
exploitation by weaker adversaries willing to engage in political and legal lines of
operations against superior U.S. military technologies and capabilities.3
The authors believe that it is possible for a competitor or potential enemy to
use systemic American vulnerabilities to wage a campaign of misinformation and
legal challenges to reduce U.S. military and antisubmarine-warfare readiness. In
particular, this article focuses on how adversaries could use environmental lawfare covertly to wage war against the use of active sonar during testing, training,
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and operations. Allowed to proceed unchecked heretofore, this use of undersea
lawfare may already be providing potential adversaries an inexpensive way of
reducing the antisubmarine-warfare capabilities of the U.S. Navy and its allies.
This article is intended to stimulate action by warfighters and policy makers to
identify, assess, and address this threat.
The article begins with an overview of asymmetric warfare, an introduction to
lawfare as a form of warfare, and some historical examples of international lawfare. It then analyzes the potential military lawfare vulnerabilities to international
environmental bodies and political processes as well as to American domestic
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes. The article concludes with
some lawfare threat-assessment indicators and possible courses of action.
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE / LAWFARE
Asymmetric warfare threats are nothing new.4 Noting that “at the dawn of the
21st century, the United States of America faces a broad and complex array of
challenges to our national security,” the White House’s 2010 National Security
Strategy stated, “In addition to facing enemies on traditional battlefields, the
United States must now be prepared for asymmetric threats.”5 Reiterating the
domestic threat posed by this mode of warfare, the Department of Defense’s 2013
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities states,
“Potential nation-state adversaries will continue to refine asymmetric attack
plans against the homeland as part of their concepts of operation and broader
military strategies of confrontation with the United States.”6 It now becomes a
matter of identifying and neutralizing these threats.
By their very nature, asymmetric nontraditional threats come in myriad forms
and are especially difficult to conceptualize and combat. Knowing this, policy
makers and warfighters must engage in rigorous and comprehensive strategic,
operational, and tactical vulnerability self-assessments to identify and mitigate
future challenges. In the past, these self-assessments have focused almost exclusively on a limited number of more traditional asymmetric threats (e.g., cyber
and terrorist). Unfortunately, as the 9/11 attack and the recent North Korean
cyber attacks more than amply demonstrated, asymmetric threats are often not
identified in time to prevent damage; more-effective and more-meaningful assessments must account for creative and novel attacks. Consideration of the entire
spectrum of potential asymmetric threats requires truly imaginative thinking.
Such thinking cannot simply ignore previously unidentified threats to U.S.
military capabilities and the changing nature of warfare. In their 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army address some mechanisms a nation such as China can use to
defeat a technologically superior adversary, such as the United States.7 Noting
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/8
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the narrow American focus on technology, Qiao and Wang argue that the United
States is particularly vulnerable to attack along nontechnological legal, economic,
and terrorist lines.8 The U.S. Department of Defense in its 2005 National Defense
Strategy acknowledged the issue: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to
be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international
forums, judicial processes, and terrorism.”9 Thus, an adversary’s use (or misuse) of
international political processes, domestic laws, and judicial processes constitutes
a recognized and potentially feasible asymmetric threat.
INTERNATIONAL LAWFARE
The term “lawfare” may be of recent vintage, but its practice in international
forums is not new. Weaker nation-states have long used international legal processes, world opinion, and domestic political support to try to level the playing
field and neutralize an adversary’s technological or other advantages. Qiao and
Wang describe international law warfare as “seizing the earliest opportunity to
set up regulations.”10 This initiative allows an adversary to define the “problem,”
control the agenda, force adverse responses, and achieve desired results.
Historically, weaker parties have attempted to achieve such leveling by asserting that a stronger party’s technology, weapons, or doctrines violate the
international law of armed conflict. When successful, these efforts achieve an inexpensive, asymmetric, nonkinetic impact that restricts a stronger nation-state’s
military capabilities while undercutting its strategic or operational advantage. A
historical example of the use of an international agreement to obtain and secure
a strategic advantage is the attempt at the 1856 Congress of Paris to set limits to
naval warfare by closing the Black Sea to all warships.11 Other instances, involving
operational or tactical advantages, are Pope Urban II’s ban on the use of the crossbow against Christians in 1097; the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which
prohibited explosive bullets under forty grams in weight; and the Convention of
1899, which banned the use of expanding (“dumdum”) ammunition.12
Modern examples of parties using international bodies, other forums, and the
Internet to limit U.S. military capabilities include efforts to shut down the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; to ban the testing of nuclear weapons;
and to prohibit land mines, cluster munitions, space weapons, blinding lasers,
drones, etc.13 An excellent illustration of international lawfare is the ongoing attempt to blunt superior U.S. military technological capabilities by arguing that
laser-guided “smart bomb” munitions render traditional “dumb bomb” kinetic
munitions impermissibly indiscriminate under the law of armed conflict.14 The
above cases may be motivated solely by humanitarian concerns, but they make
clear how malevolent or hostile actors could exercise lawfare for military and
national strategic advantages.15
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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All of this appears to have been given only limited consideration by historians,
policy makers, or warfighters, and that usually focused on an adversary’s use or
misuse of international law, mostly the law of war or of armed conflict. Nothing
limits the exploitation of international or domestic laws and legal processes to
achieve strategic, operational, or tactical advantage. The option to exploit American environmental-protection processes and laws is particularly attractive, given
their particular susceptibility to abuse and manipulation.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE
The environmental subset of lawfare is the use or misuse of environmentalprotection laws and legal processes as a substitute for traditional military means
to achieve objectives.16 What would such a campaign against the United States,
specifically against the Navy’s antisubmarine capabilities, look like? To follow the
Unrestricted Warfare playbook: adversaries, operating through activist environmental organizations—their knowing or unknowing proxies—would manipulate
influential international forums, conferences, or governing bodies in a multipronged strategy to neutralize particular U.S. military superiorities, whether
technological, tactical, or strategic.
An adversary’s first need is for a proxy. Failing to co-opt an authentic wellintentioned environmental group, it must create an entity that appears to be one,
that closely parallels the structure and operations of such successful nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as the Natural Resources Defense Council or
Greenpeace.17 These organizations’ activities would include fund-raising, press
conferences, press releases, blogs, websites, social media campaigns, lobbying,
meetings, conferences, and symposia, as well as partnerships with other respected NGOs and influential organizations, universities, and individuals and sponsorship of “research.” To the public, these activities would appear to be legitimate,
if not noble, aimed solely at the protection of marine mammals or the promotion
of other oceanic environmental causes. In these ways proxy environmental NGOs
would achieve significant leverage, building on the infrastructure, strategic communications, and other achievements of the scores of legitimate groups. Ideally,
from the adversary’s viewpoint, they could perform as self-funded, self-sufficient,
and perpetual “launch and forget” weapons.
Next would be the development and execution of an effects-based, multimedia, external strategic communications plan. This plan would be centered on a
comprehensive, well-resourced, and emotion-based public relations campaign
that attempts to create both an “environmental crisis” and an “international consensus.” That consensus would point to a predetermined solution that only the
proxy group can provide and that is, not coincidentally, inimical to targeted U.S.
military capabilities.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/8
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Recent efforts by (doubtless genuine) environmentalists demonstrate the potential effects of international strategic communications campaigns on military
readiness. For example, environmentalists have expended significant effort and
expense in public relations and strategic communications campaigns to “correlate” military active-sonar use with worldwide marine-mammal mass strandings.
These events include, but are not limited to, the Canary Islands (1985, 1988, 1989,
2002, 2004), Greece (1996), the U.S. Virgin Islands (1998, 1999), the Bahamas
(2000), Madeira (2000), the northwest coast of the United States (2003), and the
coast of North Carolina (2005).18
Let us set aside the emotional message of the environmentalists and look at
the facts. The Navy has been using active sonar for testing and training for over
eighty-five years in the waters listed above and in other waters under the same
conditions. Despite millions of dollars’ worth of dedicated research, NGOs and
other groups have been unable to present a single persuasive, peer-reviewed,
empirically based, scientific study that definitively links military sonar use to significant long-term adverse physiological impacts on marine mammals. At best,
opponents of military sonar have “correlated” worldwide antisubmarine training
and active-sonar employment with the stranding of approximately fifty marine
mammals during the period 1996–2006, an average of five per year. The loss of
five marine mammals per year to military sonar use pales in comparison to the
estimated six hundred thousand marine mammals killed each year in the same
period by commercial fisheries.19 In the meantime, countries such as Iceland,
Norway, and Japan continue to hunt whales, Japan alone accounting for nearly
two thousand whale deaths a year under its controversial “research” and other
treaty exemptions.20
Despite these facts, the campaign against Navy training activities and active
sonar use has been, by any measure, spectacularly successful. Given the relative
lack of meaningful natural-resource-protection benefit to be gained by either
eliminating or reducing antisubmarine-warfare training worldwide, the prudent
response is to ask, Where’s the crisis? Even better questions are, How and why
did this become a crisis? How are these efforts affecting U.S. military capabilities?
Granting for argument’s sake the highest motivations for the current anti-activesonar strategic communications campaign, it should be clear that an adversary
could mount a similar campaign to obtain comparable or more damaging results.
This possibility is relevant for any asymmetric-threat assessment.
Another avenue of attack using international lawfare is targeting influential
international forums, conferences, and governing bodies in aggressive and sophisticated lobbying and “educational” campaigns. A potential adversary’s initial
attempt will be to use or modify existing international treaties, conventions, or
regional agreements to obtain statements, resolutions, or other endorsements for
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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significant reductions in the use of, for example, military sonar testing, training,
and operations.
Again, consider the effectiveness of environmental-group efforts. For more
than a decade coalitions of environmentalists and others have lobbied and influenced numerous international bodies against the use of military active sonars
because of the alleged harm caused to marine resources in general and marine
mammals in particular. Table 1 lists some of the major “wins” by these groups
during the last decade. They represent diversions of time, effort, and resources on
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS
Legal Body / Document

Purpose

Action

1994, United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea

UNCLOS, with 157 signatories, is
the seminal document governing
international maritime activities, including environmental protection.a

Generally codifying customary
international law, UNCLOS, among
other things, assigns member states
an affirmative obligation and responsibility to protect and preserve
the marine environment as well as
requires member states to assess and
communicate the potential impacts
of their activities on the marine
environment.b UNCLOS regulates
“pollution of the marine environment,” defined, in relevant part, as
“the introduction by man, directly
or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment.” c

2004, International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling

The ICRW is an international
agreement signed in 1946 to ensure
the protection and conservation of
worldwide whale stocks by establishing a system of international regulation of the members and contracting
governments’ commercial, scientific,
and aboriginal whaling practices.d

Its June 2004 International Whaling
Commission’s Scientific Committee
Report claimed that “compelling
evidence” implicates ocean noise as a
threat to marine mammals.e

2004, European Parliament

The EP is the directly elected parliamentary body of the member states
of the European Union.f Together
EP and the Council of the European
Union form the bicameral legislative
branch of the EU’s institutions.

In October 2004, the EP overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling for
a moratorium on military sonars.g

2004, International Union for Conservation of Nature
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INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS CONTINUED
Legal Body / Document

Purpose

Action

2006, Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea,
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous
Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) / 2006,
Agreement on the Conservation of
Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North
East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas
(ASCOBANS)

Aimed at preserving and protecting the numerous small migratory
cetacean species native to the seas
bordering Europe, including dolphins, whales, and harbor porpoises,
the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS
are regional cooperative agreements
“to reduce threats to cetaceans,
improve knowledge, and conserve
marine diversity.”i

In December 2006 ASCOBANS
parties passed Resolution 4,
“Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels
and Other Forms of Disturbance
on Small Cetaceans,” calling for the
development of effective mitigation
measures to “reduce disturbance of,
and potential physical damage to,
small cetaceans.”j

CMS is an intergovernmental treaty
concerned with the conservation
of terrestrial, marine, and avian
migratory wildlife and habitats on a
global scale.l

Meeting in Rome in December 2008,
the CMS Conference of Parties adopted a resolution entitled “Adverse
Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise
Impacts on Cetaceans and Other
Biota” (Resolution 9.19).m Resolution
9.19 recognizes anthropogenic ocean
noise as a form of energy “pollution”
and reaffirms that “the difficulty of
proving negative impacts of acoustic
disturbance on cetaceans necessitates a precautionary approach in
cases where such impact is likely.”n

2008, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals

“The European Cetacean Society
resolution adopted during the 23rd
Conference (2009), requests to urgently adopt and enforce regulations
for effective mitigation of active sonar use. This Resolution particularly
urges competent authorities to take
into account the conservation status
and the potential and known effects
of sonar on beaked whales.”k

Notes:
		 Acronyms used in tables 1 and 2 are expanded in table 3.
a. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereafter UNCLOS]. An overview and copy of the full text is
available at United Nations, www.un.org/. See Elena M. McCarthy, “International Regulation of Transboundary Pollutants: The Emerging Challenge
of Ocean Noise,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 6, no. 2 (2001), pp. 275–77.
b. UNCLOS, arts. 192, 204–206.
c. Ibid., art. 1(1)(4) [emphasis added].
d. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. A copy of the convention is available at International Whaling Commission Key Documents,
iwc.int/convention. The list of the ICRW members and contracting governments is available at International Whaling Commission, iwc.int/.
e. International Whaling Commission, Scientific Committee (IWC-SC) Report Annex K: Report of the Standing Working Group on Environmental Concerns (Cambridge, U.K.: May 2004). A copy of the report is available at The Acoustic Ecology Institute, www.acousticecology.org/.
f. European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu/.
g. European Parliament, Resolution on the Environmental Effects of High-Intensity Active Naval Sonars, B6-0089/2004, available at awionline.org/. The
resolution called on the EU and its member states to “adopt a moratorium on the deployment of high-intensity active naval sonars until a global
assessment of their cumulative environmental impact on marine mammals, fish and other marine life has been completed.”
h. International Union for Conservation of Nature World Conservation Congress, Resolution 3.068, “Undersea Noise Pollution,” in Resolutions and
Recommendations: World Conservation Congress, Bangkok, Thailand, 17–25 November 2004 (Gland, Switz.: 2005), available at cmsdata.iucn
.org/.
i. Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS). Text available at
ACCOBAMS, www.accobams.org/. There are currently twenty-eight contracting-party governments; a complete list as of September 2011 is at ibid.
ACCOBAMS was established under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme’s 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; see Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, www.cms.int/en.
j. 5th Meeting of the Parties to ASCOBANS, the Netherlands, 18–20 September and 12 December 2006, Resolution 4, Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels
and Other Forms of Disturbance on Small Cetaceans, available at www.ascobans.org/.
k. Fifth Meeting of the Parties to ACCOBAMS, Tangier, 5–8 November 2013, Anthropogenic Noise and Marine Mammals: Review of the Effort in Addressing the Impact of Anthropogenic Underwater Noise in the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS Areas, p. 16, available at www.cbd.int/.
l. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
m. Convention on Migratory Species, Ninth Conference of the Parties, Rome, 1–5 December 2008, Adverse Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise Impacts
of Cetaceans and Other Biota, UNEP/CMS/Resolution 9.19, available at www.cms.int/.
n. Ibid., p. 2.
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the part of the U.S. Navy, to the detriment of readiness and national defense. The
long-term impacts, if any, have yet to be fully assessed and quantified. But these
actions succinctly illustrate how strategic communications campaigns can seize
effective control of processes and achieve desired end states. The proponents of
the activities listed in table 1 are presumably at least willing to accept degradation of both antisubmarine-warfare capability and overall readiness. It is not
difficult to imagine the assimilation of similar processes, to obtain comparably
adverse impacts, by actors who specifically desire to target military capability or
technological superiority.
A logical extension and continuation of international environmental lawfare
would be new international treaties, conventions, or agreements directly reducing or banning particular technologies or warfighting capabilities. Suggestive of
what such efforts would look like, were it in the hands of an actual adversary, is
Greenpeace International’s proposal for a global network of marine reserves covering 40 percent of the world’s oceans, including international waters.21 If enacted, the implications for military readiness and operations are painfully obvious.
It should be noted that a significant constraint on an adversarial international
lawfare arises from one of the limitations of international law itself: the general
lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Since all nation-states are sovereign, each unilaterally decides whether to commit itself to given international
conventions, treaties, or agreements. Even when a nation-state does so, compliance remains voluntary and effectively immune from enforcement in case of
alleged or real violations.
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE
This situation changes dramatically, however, when a potential adversary shifts to
the arena of American domestic environmental law. The United States proclaims
itself a world leader in environmental and natural-resource protection. The Environmental Protection Agency is a cabinet-level entity, and Congress has enacted
over a hundred environmental laws since 1899 establishing programs to improve
air and water quality; handle solid, hazardous, and toxic wastes; clean up landfills; and protect endangered species, as well as natural and cultural resources.
In the United States, environmental-protection laws differ from most other
federal statutes in that Congress has intentionally waived U.S. sovereign immunity. The majority of American environmental-protection laws mandate
federal-agency compliance and apply injunctive, civil, and criminal sanctions
to the government’s employees, officers, and officials. For the most part, these
waivers of federal sovereignty do not exempt the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the Navy, like other federal agencies, is subject to myriad federal and,
in some cases, state, territorial, and tribal environmental laws and regulations.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/8
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These include, but are not limited to, the “big four” affecting maritime readiness:
National Environmental Policy Act requirements for preactivity environmental
impact statements; Marine Mammal Protection Act requirements for incidental
take authorizations; Endangered Species Act requirements for consultation prior
to any activities that “may affect” a threatened or endangered species or habitat;
and Coastal Zone Management Act requirements for federal agency “consistency” with state coastal-zone management.22
To take midfrequency active sonar as an example, the Navy is required to assess the potential impacts of its use on the environment and maritime resources.
To start with, it must conduct requisite preactivity environmental planning, including documented impact analyses to determine whether the intended sonar
use will adversely affect marine resources. If expected impacts exceed certain
statutory or regulatory thresholds, the Navy is required to consult federal and
state regulatory and coastal-resource agencies. It may also be required to obtain
federal authorization. These consultations, authorizations, approvals, and notifications often produce detrimental restrictions of time, place, and operational
mode, such as prohibition of sonar use at night.
U.S. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Increasing the attractiveness to potential adversaries of encumbering U.S. Navy
military readiness with burdensome agency approvals processes (and the possibility of civil damage awards and court injunctions) is the 1980 Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).23 The EAJA authorizes U.S. federal courts to award (aside from
injunctions and civil damages) costs and attorney fees “in any civil action brought
by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States.”24
These “civil actions” include environmental and resource-protection compliance
challenges. Originally intended to assist small businesses to defend themselves
from governmental agency actions, the EAJA also extends to 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organizations, including environmental NGOs and other private groups.
Under the EAJA, plaintiffs, if they prevail, are entitled to reimbursement for
their attorney fees, up to $750 per hour, and other allowed costs incurred in bringing the lawsuit (e.g., expert witness fees, costs of scientific studies, mailings). In
some cases, costs and attorney’s fees are payable even to plaintiffs who ultimately
lose their legal challenges. Exact costs to the federal government and American
taxpayers are apparently unknown, untracked, and unreported by most federal
agencies. One Government Accountability Office study tracked 525 reimbursements during 2001–10 resulting in $44.4 million in legal-fee reimbursements.25
Some examples to date from recent federal lawsuits by environmental groups and
others challenging U.S. Navy active sonar include approximately $1.7 million for
a 2002 lawsuit challenging low-frequency sonar use in the Pacific; approximately
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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$400,000 for the five-day injunction on U.S. midfrequency active sonar during
the 2006 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational training exercise; and over
$500,000 in attorney fees and costs alone related to an injunction in the Navy’s
Southern California Operating Area.
The EAJA “fee shifting” mechanism provides both an incentive and a steady
source of income to law firms willing to litigate environmental compliance challenges against U.S. military departments and its officials, even on behalf of potential adversaries engaging in an asymmetric lawfare campaign. From the perspective of lawfare vulnerabilities, judicial enforcement of federal agency compliance
provides adversaries an effective, essentially cost-free means to engage in legal
lines of attack against U.S. military readiness.
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION
For over a decade the Navy has been challenged in federal court by environmental NGOs and other groups seeking court orders enjoining active-sonar use, testing, and training. While their specifics vary slightly, these legal challenges have
commonalities. They all allege violations of American domestic environmentalplanning and natural-resource-protection laws, and they all seek judicial intervention to reduce or end, temporarily or permanently, Navy midfrequency
active-sonar testing and training. Finally, the lawsuits target almost exclusively
the Pacific theater antisubmarine warfare training areas off the coasts of California, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest.26 As one example, on 3 July 2006 the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California issued an injunction barring
the Navy from training with midfrequency active sonar during RIMPAC 2006 off
the Big Island of Hawaii.27
Table 2 summarizes the major domestic legal challenges against the Navy since
2002. Like table 1, it shows clearly how an adversary could capitalize on American domestic environmental laws and federal judicial processes to eliminate or
degrade military capabilities.
LAWFARE THREAT-ASSESSMENT INDICATORS
The authors understand the inherent difficulties of identifying and assessing
nontraditional asymmetric threats as a whole or of legal lines of operations in
particular—hence the appeal of lawfare to potential adversaries. The following
considerations may help separate actual threats from the background “noise” of
legitimate challenges.
What Is the Target?
Is the international effort, strategic communications campaign, or lawsuit
aiming at an increase in environmental or natural-resource protection or at
something else? Does it seek rather to limit military-readiness activities, such as
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/8
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TABLE 2
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES
Case

Court

Claim

Result

Natural Resources Defense
Council v. U.S. Navy

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(C.D. Cal. 2002)

NEPA, ESA, MMPA, and
MSA violated by U.S.
Navy’s LWAD program,
including active sonar

Dismissed

NRDC v. Evans

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(N.D. Cal. 2002)

MMPA, ESA, and NEPA
violated by U.S. Navy’s
peacetime use of lowfrequency active sonar
systems (SURTASS-LFA)
for training, testing, and
routine operations in the
world’s oceans

Permanent “tailored”
injunction granted to
plaintiffs limiting U.S.
Navy’s use

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(D. Haw. 2003)

ESA, MMPA, and NEPA
violated by U.S. Navy
use of SURTASS-LFA
for training, testing, and
routine operations in the
world’s oceans

Dismissed—whales and
dolphins were not “persons” under the acts and
therefore lacked standing
to bring claims

NRDC v. Winter I

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(C.D. Cal. 2005)

NEPA, APA, and ESA
violated by all U.S. Navy
uses of midfrequency active sonars

Injunction sought

NRDC v. Winter II

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(C.D. Cal. 2006) [amended complaint]

MMPA, NEPA, ESA,
and CZMA violated by
U.S. Navy’s use of MFAS
during its international
RIMPAC exercises off
Hawaii

Preliminary injunction
granted prohibiting U.S.
Navy use of MFAS for
training

NRDC v. Winter II

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(C.D. Cal. 2007) [amended complaint]

MMPA, NEPA, ESA,
and CZMA violated by
U.S. Navy’s use of MFAS
during exercises in the
Southern California
Operating Area February
2007–February 2009

Preliminary injunction
granted, later vacated
for tailored injunction
measures

NRDC v. Winter II

U.S. Supreme Court
(2008)

U.S. Navy alleged lower
courts erred in granting
injunctions

Lower courts reversed

NRDC v. Gutierrez

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(N.D. Cal. 2008)

MMPA, NEPA, and ESA
violated by U.S. Navy
SURTASS-LFA use on the
world’s oceans

2002 injunction continued; case settled

Ocean Mammal Inst. v.
Gates

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(D. Haw. 2008)

NEPA, ESA, CZMA, and
MSA violated by U.S. Navy’s use of MFAS in twelve
undersea warfare exercises
in the Hawaiian Islands
Operating Area January
2007–January 2009

Preliminary injunction
ordered requiring U.S.
Navy implementation
of restrictive mitigation
measures
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U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES CONTINUED
Case

Court

Claim

Result

Earthjustice et al. v. Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS)a

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(N.D. Cal. 2012)

APA, ESA, and MMPA
violated by U.S. Navy’s
MFAS use for ASW
training in its Northwest
Training Range Complex
off Washington State

Injunction sought by
plaintiffs to enjoin U.S.
Navy MFAS use

Earthjustice et al. v. NMFS,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
and U.S. Navyb

U.S. Federal Dist. Court
(D. Haw. 2014)

ESA, NEPA, and MMPA
violated by U.S. Navy
MFAS use for ASW
training in its Hawaii–
Southern California
Training and Testing
Study Area

Summary judgment in
favor of environmental
NGO plaintiffs granted on
31 March 2015

Notes:
a. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (No. Dist. of Cal.), 25 January 2012, available at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice,
InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council, Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., People for Puget Sound, Friends of
the San Juans, and Friends of the Earth.
b. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (Dist. of Hawaii), Civil No. 13-00684 SOM RLP, 15 January 2015, available
at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice, Conservation Council for Hawai’i, Animal Welfare Institute, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Ocean
Mammal Institute.
Source: Craig, “Beyond Winter v. NRDC.”

development, testing, training, and operation? For example, does the group target
only U.S. Navy active sonar but not other maritime activities potentially equally
harmful to marine resources, such as commercial shipping, fishing, naturalresource exploration, air-gun arrays, or recreational boating?28
Analysts should also consider what other activities groups are targeting. Illustrative are two separate lawsuits, filed in 2003 and 2004, in which environmental
NGOs sued the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service to
stop it from issuing scientific research permits to determine the impacts of active
sonar on marine mammals.29 In one case, the court issued a temporary injunction
against scientific experimentation in the northern Pacific Ocean to test whalefinding high-frequency sonar on grey whales.30 Again, our reasonably prudent
policy maker and warfighter should be asking why any group or individual
purportedly dedicated to environmental and natural-resource protection would
actively attempt to impede scientific studies to determine whether an activity
may have an adverse environmental or natural-resource impact.
Finally, are U.S. military technologies or capabilities exclusively, or almost
exclusively, the targets? Since similar human activities will likely cause adverse
impacts anywhere in the world regardless of the political or military affiliation,
genuine environmental challenges should be politically and militarily neutral
in strategy and tactics. Disparities here may indicate malicious intent. It casts
no aspersion on any environmental group or individual—certainly none is
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intended—to point out in this connection a potentially important discrepancy in
current practice. At least one major environmental NGO has adopted the strategy of mounting challenges in federal court to compel U.S. Navy environmental
compliance while simultaneously adopting cooperative “partnerships” to obtain
equivalent Chinese and Russian environmental compliance.31 The nationality
of the military forces should be irrelevant, one might reasonably expect, to the
potential adverse impacts of waterborne sound energy on marine resources.
Motivation matters.
Where Is the Targeted Activity?
Lawfare analysts should look for temporal, political, and geographic discrepancies. For example, it seems interesting and relevant that aggressive international
efforts, strategic communications campaigns, and domestic judicial challenges
against military sonar use started only within the last decade or so, although the
U.S. Navy has used sonar for eighty-five years and Congress has enacted environmental protection laws for over forty. As noted above, environmental efforts
appear focused almost exclusively on Pacific Fleet testing and training areas.
Temporally and spatially they seem aligned with the national security “pivot to
Asia” and with geopolitical events in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility. They also coincide with China’s drive for naval domination on both sides of
the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait and with its (and other
potential adversaries’) growing acquisition of quiet conventional and nuclear
submarines. These strategic shifts, in turn, have driven a resurgence of interest
within the U.S. Navy in antisubmarine warfare. If military sonars do adversely
affect marine mammals at the individual and species “crisis” levels claimed by
environmental organizations, one would expect the impacts to be worldwide. Yet
to date there has been little or no such interest in, and few lawsuits and injunctions have sought to stop, similar sonar use or training in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf
of Mexico, Mediterranean, or Persian Gulf.
It goes without saying that no one factor alone is determinative in identifying
and assessing potential lawfare threats. Each situation is fact and circumstance
specific. It is the very nature of nontraditional warfare threats that other factors
exist outside the scope of this article. What is required is either creativity from
future analysts or the harsh reality of 20/20 hindsight gained from hard lessons
learned.
DEALING WITH AN UNINTENDED VULNERABILITY
Policy makers and warfighters today should not allow themselves to be complacent or, worse, uncreative about such threats as environmental lawfare. They
must be open to exploring all avenues of attack available to potential adversaries,
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TABLE 3
ACRONYMS
ACCOBAMS

Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area

APA

Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC § 701 et seq. [1946])

ASCOBANS

Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and
North Seas

ASW

antisubmarine warfare

CMS

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (also Bonn Convention)

CZMA

Coastal Zone Management Act (16 USC § 1451 et seq. [1972])

EP

European Parliament

ESA

Endangered Species Act (7 USC § 136, 16 USC § 1531 et seq. [1973])

EU

European Union

ICRW

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

kHz

kilohertz

LWAD

Littoral Warfare Advanced Development (program)

MFAS

midfrequency active sonara

MMPA

Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 USC § 1361 et seq. [1972])

MSA

Marine Sanctuaries Act (16 USC § 1431 et seq. and 33 USC § 1401 et seq. [1988])

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC § 4321 et seq. [1969])

NGO

nongovernmental organization

RIMPAC

Rim of the Pacific (exercise series)

SURTASS-LFA

Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)–Low-Frequency Active (LFA)b

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Notes:
a. U.S. Justice Dept., “Mid- and Low-Frequency Sonar,” The United States Department of Justice, September 2014, www.justice.gov/ (“Mid-frequency
active sonar (1kHz–10kHz) is the Navy’s primary tactical sonar and its main tool to combat the threat posed by the world-wide proliferation of ultraquiet diesel submarines”).
b. Ibid. (“SURTASS-LFA is a low frequency passive surveillance system that is deployed on surface ships with acoustic data collection and analysis capabilities. It provides passive detection of quiet nuclear and diesel submarines and real-time reporting of surveillance information to theater commanders”).

recognizing the potential for long-term strategic damage inflicted by a malicious
actor operating either parallel to, or in conjunction with, authentic judicial and
strategic-communications challenges to military-readiness activities.
A good rule of thumb would be that the more nontraditional, unusual, and
unfamiliar the threat, the more serious the required inquiry and assessment.
Lawfare in general, and international and domestic lawfare in particular, warrants the attention of U.S. service colleges and policy think tanks.
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Internationally, the United States is vulnerable to adverse resolutions, pronouncements, interpretations, and other actions by various international bodies,
organizations, and groups, especially those to which this nation is a party by
treaty or other similar agreement. It is imperative that analysts understand potential adversaries’ motives and capabilities, recognize vulnerabilities for threat
exploitation, and exercise due diligence to counter those threats in a timely and
effective manner.
Domestically, the congressional intent in waiving U.S. federal relief from
environmental-compliance injunctions, civil damages, and attorney’s fees and
costs was to ensure that agencies did their part to help protect the environment
and preserve natural resources. Notwithstanding, Congress has created an Achilles’ heel for military and national security, one susceptible to exploitation by
potential adversaries willing to engage in lawfare.
Lawfare attacks constitute the quintessential asymmetric threat, in that they
exploit simultaneously both strengths and weaknesses of the United States. These
weaknesses include the nation’s reliance on technology, its culturally myopic
focus on symmetric kinetic threats, and its hypersensitivity to international
opinion. The nation’s strengths include its deeply held belief in the rule of law,
its declared world leadership in environmental stewardship, and its penchant
for using treaties, laws, and judicial systems to right perceived wrongs. Finally,
the American taxpayer, through the EAJA and voluntary donations, is clearly
vulnerable to being made to subsidize lawfare attacks. Everything is in place for
a sophisticated adversary with the vision, resources, ability, and a “long view” of
history to exploit these vulnerabilities and thereby impact U.S. military capability
and readiness.
As with most asymmetric “peacetime” threats, there is little doctrine and
less agreement on how to respond effectively.32 However, several commonsense
options are available. The first is to develop processes designed to look for, recognize, and assess the full spectrum of potential and actual political or judicial
threats, such as international and domestic environmental lawfare. It just takes
creativity and some true out-of-the-box thinking.
The second is aggressive response to identified lawfare threats. Response starts
with a comprehensive and coordinated campaign to educate both military and
civilian leadership, the American public, and allies on the nature of the lawfare
involved and the strategic and operational implications for security and defense.
Senior military and executive-branch leadership should begin by elevating this
problem to a multiagency level. Currently the United States typically generates
only stovepiped, piecemeal, tactical responses—lawyers fending off lawsuits and
public affairs teams defensively replying to press inquiries.
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The international counteroffensive should not be limited to the State Department but should proactively track and participate in international conferences,
governing bodies, symposia, and other relevant forums, in an effort to educate
audiences and oppose attempts at international regulation of critical activities.
The domestic counteroffensive should focus on eliminating the pathways vulnerable to legal lines of attack, especially the exploitation of domestic law. Potential
options include, but are not limited to, defining and exempting from regulation
critical military-readiness activities, enforcing registration and tracking as applicable of environmental organizations and NGOs under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, and implementing NGO reforms similar to recent election and
lobbyist measures. The United States must insist that when it comes to limiting its
critical military capabilities, litigants must definitively prove the military activities are actually doing harm—not the other way around. The United States must
not be continuously obliged to prove its innocence in public forums, online, and
in the courtroom.
Additional responses include limiting judicial review of such cases, removing injunctions as an enforcement option, and legislatively requiring regulatory
agencies and courts to balance military-readiness impacts with environmental
protection. Finally, Congress should shift critical environmental compliance of
military-readiness activity from a matter of statute to presidential executive order. This would maintain the imperative for environmental protection by federal
agencies but remove judicial enforcement vulnerabilities. An excellent model
is the executive order directing the services to conduct rigorous environmental
planning and impact assessments for overseas activities but ensuring these requirements remain free from international or American domestic law interference, enforcement, or abuse.33
Potential adversaries are clearly thinking about “subdu[ing] the enemy without fighting” by asymmetric attack against U.S. military capabilities under the
guise of environmental and natural-resource protection or other types of lawfare.
American policy makers and warfighters can afford not to respond only if they
believe no potential adversary will recognize or act on exploitable vulnerabilities.
If adversaries do seize the opportunity, they may without opposition achieve their
likely goal—cheaply and effectively eliminating or reducing U.S. Navy readiness.
In the case of capabilities against quiet diesel-electric and nuclear submarines,
this reduction or elimination will lead to inability to protect sea lines of communications, cause a wasteful expenditure of resources in exchange for a minimal
benefit in natural-resource protection, and substantially reduce U.S. operational
and strategic options. To exercise the doctrinal creativity required to recognize,
assess, and respond to such nontraditional asymmetric warfare threats as possible
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environmental lawfare is not paranoid but rather a prudent exercise in cautionary
strategic thinking.
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